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Under the current race-neutral standard for reasonable and articula-
ble suspicion to justify a police stop, Blacks are subject to a
disproportionate number of stops because the current standard fails to
take account of the unique experience of Blacks in the criminal justice
system. This paper will propose a new standard for evaluating reasonable
suspicion in "flight plus evasion police stops justified by the United
States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio: a reasonable Black person stan-
dard that would explicitly take into account the perspective of a
reasonable Black person.
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1. David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: Hhen Black and Poor Means
Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 660 (1994) (using this term to refer to cases where
crime-prone location and movement away from the police qualify as reasonable suspicion
to justify stopping the person).
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Randall Susskind originally proposed the "reasonable African
American standard" for Terry stops as a way to minimize racial disparities
in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.' This paper will expand upon
Susskind's suggested standard within the specific context of "location
plus evasion" stops, in which suspects are stopped upon flight in a high-
crime neighborhood. Part one will present the reasonable Black person
standard in the context of Illinois v. Wardlow, a recent "location plus
evasion case." 3 Part one will then show how this alternative standard
better accounts for Wardlow's "raced" decision to flee, the police offi-
cers' "raced" decision to stop him, and the Court's "raced" decision to
find reasonable and articulable suspicion. Part two will discuss and com-
pare the reasonable Black person standard with analogous alternative
reasonable person standards in sexual harassment and criminal law. Part
three will anticipate and rebut potential criticisms of the proposed stan-
dard.
I. THE REASONABLE BLACK PERSON STANDARD
The United States Supreme Court formulated the current race-
neutral reasonable suspicion standard for investigatory police stops in
Terry v. Ohio.4 Because the Fourth Amendment protects individuals from
unreasonable searches and seizures, police can only stop a suspect to
investigate a crime if the stop is reasonable. Before the Terry decision,
6police needed probable cause to justify any search and seizure. In Terry,
the Court lessened the standard to reasonable and articulable suspicion
for brief investigatory stops. Reasonable suspicion is evaluated in light of
the totality of the circumstances and from the perspective of a reasonable
person in the police officer's situation. Race and ethnicity are not di-
rectly taken into account under this analysis.
2. Randall S. Susskind, Race, Reasonable Articulable Suspicion, and Seizure, 31 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 327, 349 (1994).
3. 120 S. Ct. 673 (2000).
4. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
6. Terry, 329 U.S. at 20-21, 30.
7. Id. at 27, 30.
8. See id. at 21-22 (footnotes omitted).
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The Supreme Court reiterated its commitment to a colorblind
analysis of Terry stops in Wardlow when it applied the race-neutral rea-
sonable suspicion standard to the stop of a Black man fleeing in a high-
crime neighborhood.9 In Wardlow, the defendant, a middle-aged African
American male,1 ° was spotted fleeing police officers in a known drug
trafficking neighborhood in Chicago." Uniformed police officers Nolan
and Harvey, who arrived at the scene in a four-car caravan expecting to
find drug customers and dealer lookouts, stopped Wardlow, who fled the
scene after seeing the police.12 A subsequent pat-down search yielded a
.38-caliber handgun.' 3 Reversing the appellate court, the Supreme Court
found sufficient reasonable and articulable suspicion to justify the stop
based on Wardlow's combined flight and presence in a high-crime area.'
4
Differentiating unprovoked flight from the right to go 'about one's
business,' the Court held that, "headlong flight-whenever it occurs-is a
consummate act of evasion: it is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing,
but it is certainly suggestive of such."'0
By failing to incorporate the individual suspect's perspective into
the reasonableness standard for suspicion, the Court applied and articu-
lated a superficial reasonableness standard that is too deferential to police
officers' perceptions of reasonableness. Wardlow's stop satisfied the cur-
rent reasonable suspicion standard because Officer Nolan was able to
point to race-neutral reasons for the stop. 6 Consequently, under this
current standard, courts can essentially rubber-stamp an officer's inter-
pretation of a suspect's behavior as long as that interpretation does not
explicitly rely upon race.17
This paper proposes a new standard for "location plus evasion" cases
such as Wardlow. Under a new reasonable Black person standard, reason-
able suspicion would be evaluated in light of the race of the suspect. For
example, to justify the stop in Wardlow, the officers' suspicion must
9. See Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. at 675-76.
10. See David C. Slade, Run! It's the Cops!, WORLD & 1, Dec. 1, 1999, at 86. Note
that the Supreme Court does not identify Wardlow's race in an attempt to de-emphasize
the significance of race in this police encounter. See Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the
Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 956 (1999) (examining
the Court's persistent attempts to remove race from cases in an effort to enforce a color-
blind notion of the Fourth Amendment).
11. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. at 674.
12. See id. at 674-75.
13. See id. at 675.
14. See id. at 675-77.
15. Id. at 676.
16. See id. at 676.
17. See Susskind, supra note 2, at 331-32 (noting that the current standard is "highly
deferential" to the government and "shields racially discriminatory law enforcement
practices from judicial scrutiny").
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qualify as reasonable in light of Wardlow's behavior as a Black person. If
Wardlow acted reasonably and non-suspiciously given his race, the offi-
cers were not justified in stopping him. This race-specific standard will
force police officers and the Court to recognize the unique experience of
racial minorities in the United States and the significance of race in Terry
stops. By adopting this reasonable Black person standard, the Supreme
Court would finally recognize and begin correcting the racial double
standard for Terry stops.18
Under the reasonable Black person standard, courts would more
closely scrutinize the reasonableness of an officer's interpretation of a
defendant's behavior. If the officers in Wardlow knew or should have
known that Blacks in high-crime areas frequently flee to avoid police
misconduct or bystander violence, then their interpretation of Wardlow's
behavior was not reasonable and did not constitute reasonable and ar-
ticulable suspicion necessary to allow the officers to stop him.
A. The Need for a Reasonable Black Person Standard
In our criminal justice system, reasonable behavior is defined as
White behavior. By painting the reasonable White person standard as a
race-neutral reasonableness standard, courts undermine the significance of
race. Race does matter when it comes to a person's decision to flee from
police, a police officer's decision to stop a person, and a court's decision
whether to accept a police officer's judgment. As such, a criminal justice
system predicated on equality under the law should aim to cure this
discriminatory reality. 9 The current reasonable police officer standard for
Terry stops fails to recognize the unique Black perspective on police
encounters. As such, it perpetuates racial discrimination by re-enforcing
existing racial hierarchies while maintaining a facade of race-neutrality.
Professor Amar's writings on the reasonableness standard in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence support the deeper reasonableness analysis
proposed above.' ° According to Professor Amar, the Fourth Amendment
reasonableness requirement in Terry, unlike the warrant and probable
cause requirements, allows us to consider race. 21 Professor Amar argues
18. See DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE, RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 54-55 (1999) (noting two different balances are struck be-
tween competing interests in preventing crime and protecting rights for disadvantaged
Black Americans and for well-off White Americans).
19. See generally id. at 169-208 (arguing for reform to alleviate current double stan-
dards in the American criminal justice system).
20. Akhil Reed Amar, Terry and Fourth Amendment First Principles, 72 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 1097, 1099 (1998).
21. Id. at 1098 (stating that "the spacious concept of reasonableness allows us to look
race square in the eye, constitutionally").
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that "[t]he views of ordinary citizens-especially citizens specially in-
truded upon-are highly relevant to the reasonableness balance.,
22
Professor Amar's conception of reasonableness as crafted in part by those
subject to searches and seizures,23 supports a deeper reasonableness stan-
dard.
1. The Suspect's "Raced" Decision to Flee
There are a variety of legitimate, non-criminal reasons why a Black
person would flee a crime scene. These reasons relate to the sociological
experience of communities of color as minorities in the United States.
When we recognize the race-specific underpinnings that influence the
decision to flee, we accept the centrality of race to one's experience in
the criminal justice system.
a. Violence Avoidance
Perhaps the most obvious reason a Black person would choose to
flee in a high-crime neighborhood is to avoid bystander violence. Con-
sidering Blacks are more likely than other groups to be victims of
crimes,24 a Black person's decision to flee a crime scene to escape poten-
tial harm is rational and innocent. The irony here is self-evident. Those
most in need of police protection are Blacks residing in high-crime
21
neighborhoods. When such residents flee crime scenes to escape vic-
timization, they then become police targets themselves.
Of course, anyone near a crime scene is a potential victim and sus-
pect. Therefore, it would be rational for anyone to flee a crime scene.
Furthermore, witnessing a violent crime does not exhaust all rational
justifications for flight to avoid harm. Sam Wardlow fled upon seeing the
26police, not upon witnessing the commission of any violent crime. For
22. Id. at 1099.
23. See id.
24. David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why "Driving While Black"
Matters, 84 MINN. L. REv. 265, 290-91 (1999) (citing ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS:
BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE HOSTILE AND UNEQUAL 183 (1992), which found that
Blacks accounted for 50.8% of murder victims in 1990; and U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1993 15 (1996), which showed by
empirical study that the rate of victimization of Blacks exceeds the rates for other racial
groups); see also Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination: A
Comment, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1255 (1994) (citing Hanna Rosin, Action Jackson: Jesse's
Volte-face on Crime, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 24, 1994, at 17, which reported in 1994 that
Blacks are four times as likely as Whites to be raped, three times as likely to be robbed,
twice as likely to be assaulted, and seven times as likely to be murdered).
25. See Harris, supra note 24.
26. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. 673, 675 (2000).
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these reasons, Sam Wardlow's flight may be rationally explained as both
skepticism toward police and a general association of police presence
with the existence of violence.
b. Skepticism Toward Police
A second reason an innocent Black person might flee a crime scene
is to avoid confrontation with police. Lack of confidence in police offi-
cers as unbiased law enforcers27 contributes to Blacks' avoidance of police1 8
contact, regardless of guilt or innocence. Black men perceive the police
as a controlling force that functions only to enforce the social, economic
and political interests of Whites rather than as their protectors.29 Resi-
dents of high-crime neighborhoods, many of whom are Black,30 tend to
view themselves and the police as "natural adversaries in constant conflict
with one another., 31 In particular, minority men, such as Sam Wardlow,
anticipate police officers' perception of them as criminal.32 African
Americans are more skeptical of police behavior than Whites.33 African
Americans feel that they are at risk of being treated unfairly in police
encounters. 34 Unlike Whites, Blacks view police misconduct as com-
monplace, rather than anomalous.3' Blacks are also more suspicious than
27. See Omar Saleem, The Age of Unreason: The Impact of Reasonableness, Increased
Police Force, and Colorblindness on Terry "Stop and Frisk", 50 OKLA. L. REV. 451, 482
(1997).
28. See Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. at 680 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
29. See Leslie Casimir, Minority Men: We Are Frisk Targets, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Mar.
26, 1999, at 34 (describing interviews with minority men in New York City where more
than half of interviewees perceive the police as a controlling force, rather than as protec-
tors).
30. See Harris, supra note 1, at 660, 677-78.
31. Keith D. Parker et al., African Americans' Attitudes Toward the Local Police: A
Multivariate Analysis, 25 J. BLACK STUD. 396, 406 (1995).
32. See Casimir, supra note 29, at 34 (describing interviews with minority men in
New York City where more than half of interviewees believed they were singled out
because of their race and because police officers see everyone in a high-crime neighbor-
hood as a criminal.)
33. Only 26% of African Americans hold a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in
the police, as opposed to 63% of Whites. Jean Johnson, Americans' Views on Crime and
Law Enforcement, 233 NAT'L INST. OF JUST. J. 9, 12 (1997) (referring to a 1995 Gallup
survey). Similarly, 35% of African Americans have very little or no confidence in the
police, compared to 8% of Whites. Id.
34. See In Soo Son et al., Race and Its Effect on Police Officers' Perceptions of Misconduct,
26 J. CRIM. JUST. 21, 22 (1998) ( Referring to a Time/Cable News Network poll in May
1992 in which almost one half of African American respondents felt at risk of unfair
police treatment).
35. See Ronald Weitzer & Steven A. Tuch, Race, Class and Perceptions of Discrimina-
tion by the Police, 45 CRIME & DELINQ. 494, 502 (1999) (finding Blacks more likely to
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Whites that police "would use expanded stop-and-search powers unfairly
against Blacks" if the police were granted more authority to stop-and-
search suspects.36 In light of widespread skepticism among communities
of color toward police officers, it is not surprising that even innocent
people of color may flee to avoid police contact potentially leading to
public humiliation and harassment. a7
Recent studies indicate that police disproportionately target African
• 38
Americans. In particular, a study by the New York State Attorney
General indicates that African American New Yorkers are disproportion-
ately targeted for stops and frisks.39 Furthermore, the perception of police
misconduct and racial targeting are prevalent amongst Blacks.40 The real-
ity and perception of police misconduct and racial targeting may lead
Blacks to make a rational choice to flee crime scenes. Given these cir-41
cumstances, Wardlow's decision to flee may have been rational and
reasonable, rather than suspicious.
Minority suspicion of police enforcement is rooted in history.
While recent incidents of police brutality toward communities of color
have confirmed existing minority suspicions about racially biased law
perceive racial disparities in policing and less likely to perceive law enforcement as color-
blind than Whites); Eric S. Jefferis et al., The Effect of a Videotaped Arrest on Public
Perceptions of Police Use of Force, 25 J. CRIM. JUST. 381, 391 (1997) (describing minorities'
dissatisfaction with police as chronic and noting that minorities are consistently more
likely to perceive use of force by police as unjustified or excessive); Johnson, supra note
33, at 13 (noting that despite agreement about what constitutes appropriate police be-
havior between Blacks and Whites, Blacks perceive a greater prevalence of police bias
and brutality); Lee Sigelman et al., Police Brutality and Public Perceptions of Racial Discrimina-
tion: A Tale of Two Beatings, 50 POL. RESEARCH Q. 777, 790 (1997) (concluding Blacks
were more likely to generalize highly publicized incidents of police brutality as confirma-
tions of their "existing perceptions of past racial injustice", while Whites were more
likely to "'isolate' these incidents by treating them outside the historical context").
36. See Sigelman, supra note 35, at 782.
37. See Alex Kotlowitz, Hidden Casualties: Drug War's Emphasis on Law Enforcement
Takes a Toll on Police, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 1991, at Al (noting some teenagers in the
Black community of Dayton, Ohio ran at the sight of the police task force even if they
were not selling drugs because they feared the police).
38. See Michael A. Fletcher, Criminal Justice Disparities Cited, WASH. POST, May 4,
2000, at A2 (detailing a report by the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights released on
May 4, 2000).
39. See id. (detailing findings by the New York State Attorney General that 84% of
175,000 stops performed by New York City police between January 1998 and March
1999 involved Hispanics or African Americans).
40. See COLE, supra note 18, at 46-47 (noting "[t]he routine stopping of Black
citizens, particularly young Black men, is a consistent complaint in Black communities of
color across the country, and no doubt contributes to the pervasive sense among African
Americans that the criminal justice system is biased against them").
41. See Fletcher, supra note 38, at A2.
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enforcement, these suspicions are not new.42 The willingness of police to
enforce discriminatory laws, such as the southern slave codes prior to the
Civil War and "Jim Crow" thereafter, the inability or unwillingness of
police to protect Blacks from mob violence and lynching, and police
precipitation of mob violence against Blacks during the Civil Rights Era,
have all contributed to a history of betrayal of minorities by the police
force.43
However, this skepticism perpetuates a cycle of cynicism whereby
flight and subsequent police pursuit become virtually inevitable. Profes-
sor Harris describes African Americans as being caught in a "cycle of
mistrust and suspicion. ' '44 Areas considered high-crime neighborhoods
are predominately inner city neighborhoods with disproportionately
poor, African American and Hispanic residents.45 As frequent targets of
police misconduct, African Americans in these crime-ridden neighbor-
hoods are more likely to flee to avoid police contact and escape
harassment, brutality and unreasonable stops and frisks.46 Past experience,
both personal and historical, leads Blacks to anticipate biased treatment
and therefore exhibit resistant behavior, such as flight.47 When police
react to flight with harsh treatment, they reinforce existing perceptions of
racial bias. As a result, Blacks continue to resist out of fear for harsh
treatment during police encounters. In turn, police continue to respond
harshly to resistant behavior, perpetuating the cycle of cynicism.48 Thus,
perceptions of racial bias in police conduct directly impact the reality of
police-citizen encounters and the decision to flee.
42. See Sigelman, supra note 35, at 789 (noting a publicized incident of police brutal-
ity in Detroit confirmed Black residents' long held perceptions of racial prejudice).
43. See Thomas B. Priest, Evaluations of Police Performance in an African American Sam-
ple, 27 J. CRIM. JUST. 457, 463 (1999) (offering history as a probable source of African
Americans' negative evaluations of police performance); see also Kennedy, supra note 24,
at 1267 (stating that "[t]hroughout American history, officials have wielded the criminal
law as a weapon with which to intimidate blacks"); Don Wyclif, Black and Blue Encoun-
ters, CRIM. JUST. ETmcs, Summer/Fall 1998, at 84 (1988) (noting that "for most of their
history in this country, blacks have felt the edge [of the law] that enforces social con-
trol").
44. Harris, supra note 1, at 660.
45. See id. at 677-78.
46. See id. at 681.
47. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
48. See Son, supra note 34, at 27 (noting that because Blacks mistrust police they
behave resistively, which police respond to more harshly, confirming Black's perceptions
of racial bias).
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2. A Police Officer's "Raced" Decision to Stop a Suspect
A police officer's decision whether to stop a suspect is just as "race-
conscious" as is the suspect's decision to flee.49 In a colorblind world
where we refuse to acknowledge the centrality of race, a police officer's
"raced" decision to stop a suspect can be disguised by other supposedly
suspicious factors. The result is a racially discriminatory criminal justice
system facilitated by a supposedly race-neutral reasonable police officer
standard and sanctioned by a Supreme Court supposedly committed to
anti-discrimination principles.
a. Police Officer Bias Against Blacks
According to a 1990 study, over fifty-six percent of Americans per-
ceive Blacks as "violent prone."' According to Professor Cole, if most
Americans associate Blacks with criminality we can assume police officers
also hold these racist assumptions."' Other scholars also suggest that race
12plays a significant role in police officers' perceptions of citizens . Re-
search indicates that police officers hold negative and anxious attitudes
toward Blacks. 3 For example, a Los Angeles Police Department survey
published in 1991 revealed that twenty-four and a half percent of 650
responding officers agreed that "'racial bias (prejudice) on the part of
officers toward minority citizens currently exists and contributes to a
negative interaction between police and the 'community.' ,14 Such atti-
tudes may be attributed to the reality that the human brain relies on
default assumptions, such as stereotypes of Blacks as violent or dangerous,
49. This paper focuses on the race of the suspect as an influential factor in the police
officer's decision to stop a suspect. A more complete analysis would examine the influ-
ence of the race of the police officer on her decision to stop a suspect, as well.
50. Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and
Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REv. 781, 787 (1994) (quoting TOM W. SMITH,
ETHNIC IMAGES 9, 16 (1990)).
51. See COLE, supra note 18, at 41 (citing Armour, supra note 49).
52. Thompson, supra note 10, at 982-91 (discussing the influence of racial categori-
zation, schemas, and stereotyping in police officers' decisions about who to stop and
frisk); c. Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward A Normative Conception of
Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. Rav. 367, 463 (1996) (relying on research indicating that the
"human brain relies on default assumptions to interpret ambiguous situations" for support
that racial stereotypes influence reasonableness determination in self-defense cases).
53. See Tracey Maclin, "Black and Blue Encounters"-Some Preliminary Thoughts About
Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26 VAL. U. L. Rav. 243, 243-44 n.2
(1991) (citing six different studies and articles by scholars and researchers spanning three
decades that point to police officers' negative attitudes toward Blacks) (citations omitted).
54. See id. (quoting REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE Los ANGELES
POLICE DEPARTMENT 69 (1991)).
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to interpret ambiguous situations . 5 Thus, a police officer is likely to rely
on racial stereotypes in interpreting ambiguous behavior such as flight.
(i) Cognitive Schema Theory
Cognitive Schema Theory provides a psychological explanation for
why people rely on stereotypes in interpreting people's actions. Accord-
ing to this theory, individuals form cognitive schemas in interpreting
other people's actions. These schemas are based upon unique experiences
with certain types of people5 6 For example, almost everyone has devel-
oped a schema of the typical criminal that includes specific details based
upon the person's unique experience with criminals.17 "Beat" police
officers, whose experience is shaped by their disproportionate exposure
to Blacks in crime-ridden areas, are more likely to formulate a schema of
the typical criminal as Black.5" Since a police officer's criminal schema is
constantly referenced on the job, it is easily accessible and a police officer
will likely refer to and rely upon that schema to determine that innocent
Blacks are guilty. 9
According to one study involving Cognitive Schema Theory, law
enforcement officials were more likely than laypersons to assume that the
typical burglar is Black and were more likely to view the actions of
Blacks as guilty.60 This study also found that when a police officer is
convinced of a suspect's guilt, she is less likely to value or look for excul-
patory evidence.61
Following Cognitive Schema Theory, Officers Norton and Harvey
may have stopped Wardlow because he matched the officers' criminal
schema. If they were convinced of his guilt because he fit into their
schema of the typical criminal, they would have been less likely to ob-
jectively evaluate Wardlow's flight and its potentially exculpatory value
before stopping him. The current deferential reasonable police officer
standard permits officers to rely on criminal schemas. A reasonable Black
person standard that forces police officers to examine conduct from the
perspective of the suspect would minimize the exclusive reliance on a
police officer's subjective criminal schema in evaluating reasonable and
articulable suspicion.
55. See Lee, supia note 52, at 463.
56. See C.L. Ruby & John C. Brigham, A Criminal Schema: The Role of Chronicity,
Race, and Socioeconomic Status in Law Enforcement Officials' Perceptions of Others, 26 J. AP-
PLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 95, 95-96 (1996).
57. See id.
58. See id. at 96.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 104, 107.
61. See id at 107-08.
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(ii) Reliance on Proxies for Race
Criminal Schema Theory also explains why police officers rely on
racist stereotypes. The current criminal justice system does not permit
police officers to explicitly rely on race as a proxy for criminality based
on such stereotypes. Courts consistently invalidate explicit race-based
justifications for police conduct where race is used as a proxy for pro-
pensity to commit crime.6' However, unless the officer's explanation for
the stop explicitly identifies race as the sole contributing factor in the
decision to stop a suspect, the Supreme Court permits police officers to
rely on stereotypes and cognitive schemas even if heavily influenced by
race.63 As long as the police officer offers some race-neutral reason for the
stop, other reasons can act as proxies for race.64
For example, the police officers in Wardlow relied on the presence
of a high-crime neighborhood and flight as proxies for race. Though the
Wardlow standard is facially race-neutral, both the "high-crime" location
and flight are closely linked to race. High-crime neighborhoods are
61
overwhelmingly poor, segregated, inner city and minority. Similarly,
because minorities have unique and compelling reasons to flee in many
circumstances, the act of flight itself becomes raciaized.66 Consequently,
given that many people of color living in high-crime locations rationally
flee, when police are allowed to stop someone fleeing in this type of
neighborhood, they are essentially given blanket authority to stop sus-
pects on the basis of race.67
While police officers could still offer race-neutral reasons to dis-
guise the racial motivation for a stop under the reasonable Black person
standard, the new standard would make police officers more accountable
for their reasons. Such proxies for race as high-crime location and evasive
behavior would be evaluated in light of the suspect's experience. To
justify their reliance on location and evasion, Officers Nolan and Harvey
would have had to show that a Black man fleeing in this high-crime
neighborhood specifically arouses reasonable suspicion because such
62. Sheri L. Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214, 236
(1983) (discussing United States v. Robinson, 535 F.2d 881, 884 (5th Cir. 1976), United
States v. Nicholas, 448 F.2d 622, 625-26 (8th Cir. 1971), United States v. Carrizoza-
Gaxiola, 523 F.2d 239, 241 (9th Cir. 1975)).
63. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884-87 (1975).
64. See Harris, supra note 24, at 291.
65. See Harris, supra note 1, at 677-78. This is probably true not only in reality, but
also in the American imagination.
66. See id. at 660.
67. See id. While this paper focuses on the specific scenario of flight in a high-crime
neighborhood, it is worth noting that flight alone serving as a proxy for race may consti-
tute reasonable suspicion sufficient to stop a Black person fleeing even in a low-crime,
affluent White neighborhood.
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behavior is not reasonable for a Black person in this neighborhood. Still,
the reasonable Black person standard would not completely eliminate
proxies. Any enforcement of constitutional limits on police conduct
relies upon the good faith of police officers to testify truthfully.6" There
will always be a danger that police officers will commit perjury to hide
their true racial motivation. However, a reasonable Black person standard
will hopefully make falsifying testimony harder as police officers are
required to specifically explain the reasonableness of their suspicion rela-
tive to the perspective of a reasonable Black person.
Some commentators suggest that adding more factors might alle-
viate the racial bias inherent in Terry stops. 69 But even if additional factors
were required, it is possible that police officers could contrive additional
factors to serve as a proxies for race, such as a likelihood of weapons
possession. Requiring a multitude of factors, each serving as a proxy for
race, will do little to eliminate the reality that police officers choose who
to stop on the basis of race. Until the Court explicitly recognizes the
significance of race in a police officer's decision to stop a suspect, police
will always be able to contrive new proxies for race to disguise true racial
motivations. The reasonable Black person standard offers a color-
conscious resolution to the high-incidence of unwarranted Terry stops of
Blacks that would effectively minimize the use of proxies for race.
b. The Cycle of Mistrust and Resistance
Differential police treatment of Blacks and Whites may also be at-
tributed to the previously mentioned cycle of mistrust.7 1 Blacks may
exhibit resistant behavior during police encounters because they antici-
pate harsh and discriminatory treatment by the police. In turn, the police
fulfill Black expectations of police brutality and discrimination by re-
sponding harshly to resistant behavior.7 2 Similarly, police officers'
perceptions of people of color as resistant may contribute to their biased
treatment of such citizens. For example, because police officers know
68. See Margaret Raymond, Down on the Corner, Out in the Street: Considering the
Character of the Neighborhood in Evaluating Reasonable Suspicion, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 99, 128-
29 (1999).
69. See Harris, supra note 1, at 687.
70. See Edna Erez, Self-Defined 'Desert' and Citizens' Assessment of the Police, 75 J.
GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1276, 1295 (1984). One sociologist suggests Blacks may be
searched more often than Whites because of greater police suspicion of weapon posses-
sion in certain neighborhoods and among certain groups. Id.
71. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
72. See Son, supra note 48.
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that Blacks distrust them,73 they expect resistance and therefore stop
Black suspects like Wardlow even though his behavior does not arouse
reasonable suspicion.
Just as Black citizens assume police bias and respond accordingly,
police officers assume resistance by Blacks and respond accordingly,
regardless of the innocence or appropriateness of this behavior in light of
the experiences of Black people. Under a race-specific standard that
forces the police officer to consider the suspect's race, reasonable and
articulable suspicion is restrained by context. The reasonable Black per-
son standard mandates that officers be more perceptive in assessing a
defendant's behavior. This standard would make it more difficult for
police officers to rely on racial stereotypes when stopping Blacks they
perceive as resistant. The reasonable Black person standard would allevi-
ate the cycle of mistrust and resistance by not permitting officers to rely
on assumptions about Black behavior. If fewer Blacks perceive police
contact as discriminatory, fewer would resist police encounters in the
future and innocent flight might no longer be necessary.
c. Subcultural Gap
Because the reasonable police officer standard is based on a domi-
nant, White perspective, it excludes the experiences of Blacks. Evasive
behavior is culturally defined: "Behavior that reflects consciousness of
guilt among the dominant culture-of which the officer is usually a
member-may reflect only an ethnic difference when displayed by a
minority group member., 74 If nonverbal cues, such as body movement,
vary among subcultures, the race and subculture of the suspect and of the
police interpreting the suspect's actions are relevant.7 ' Thus,
"commonsense judgements and inferences about human behavior" look
less and less race-neutral when it comes to interpreting body movement
as an indicator of consciousness of guilt. 
6
Studies indicating that Blacks are disproportionately arrested with-
out probable cause, suggest that police are too quick to interpret
73. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. 673, 680-81, 681 n.9 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (pointing to evidence that police are aware of
minorities' concerns and fears of police).
74. Johnson, supra note 62, at 238.
75. See id. at 238 (citing to M. ARGYLE, BODILY COMMUNICATION 73-105 (1975); E.
HALL, THE HIDDEN DIMENSION (1966); E. HALL, THE SILENT LANGUAGE (1959); and
Ekman, Universal and Cultural Differences in Facial Expressions of Emotion, in NEBRASKA
SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION (1972)).
76. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. at 676 (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418
(1981)).
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minorities' behavior as indicative of criminality." Assuming the police
officer is White and the suspect is Black, as in Wardlow, misinterpretation
of behavior may be due to a subcultural gap. The reasonable Black per-
son standard would help correct for the subcultural gap by forcing White
and other non-Black police officers to take into account the "racial cul-
ture" of the suspect in formulating reasonable and articulable suspicion,
rather than ignoring culture-specific cues and relying on a White cultural
norm.
3. The Court's "Raced" Approach to Reasonable and
Articulable Suspicion
Despite the Supreme Court's purported "colorblind" approach, race
influences the Court's determination of reasonable suspicion as much as
it does a suspect's decision to flee and an officer's decision to stop the
suspect. The Justices invoke their own set of race-based judgments when
they hear the story of Sam Wardlow and apply standards for reasonable
suspicion based upon "commonsense judgments and inferences about
human behavior.
7 8
a. The Supreme Court's Persistent "Colorblind" Analysis
of Fourth Amendment Law
Despite the reality that Blacks have attained success relative to
Whites under race-conscious policies, (such as the Freedman's Bureau
during Reconstruction and governmental policies during World War II
and the Vietnam War,)7 9 the Supreme Court remains wedded to the
notion of colorblindness as a "moral requirement" ° of society, particu-
larly in the field of criminal law.8 '
77. See Johnson, supra note 62, at 239 (citing Hepburn, Race and the Decision to Arrest:
An Analysis of Warrants Issued, 15 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 54, 59, 66 (1978)).
78. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. at 676 (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418
(1981)).
79. See Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Colorblind Remedies and the Intersectionality of
Oppression: Policy Arguments Masquerading as Moral Claims, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 162, 173
(1994) (citing Richard B. Freeman, Black Economic Progress after 1964: Who Has Gained
and Why?, in STUDIES IN LABOR MARKETS 247, 251 (Sherwin Rosen ed., 1981); and
WILLIAM COHEN, AT FREEDOM'S EDGE: BLACK MOBILITY AND THE SOUTHERN WHITE
QUEST FOR RACIAL CONTROL, 1861-1915 48-49 (1991)).
80. Id. at 162-63 (arguing that the colorblindness principle ought to be seen as a
policy argument, not a moral goal in itself because it does not aim to change the status
quo and is merely a "legal fantasy.")
81. See generally Gary Peller, Criminal Law, Race, and the Ideology of Bias: Transcending
the Critical Tools of the Sixties, 67 TUL. L. REv. 2231 (1993); Johnson, supra note 62.
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The Supreme Court applied a colorblind analysis in Wardlow. Rea-
soning that Terry permits officers to stop even innocent individuals to
resolve ambiguity, the Court concluded that Wardlow's legitimate rea-
sons for flight did not make the stop unconstitutional. Race-specific
reasons for flight are irrelevant to the determination of reasonable suspi-
cion.82 However, Terry explicitly recognized the centrality of race in the
criminal justice system by acknowledging that stops and frisks are a main
source of racial tension between Blacks and Whites.83 Nonetheless, the
Court still insists upon a colorblind analysis in Wardlow and other search
84
and seizure cases.
The Court's limited recognition of race as central only when race is
explicitly identified as the sole factor in a decision to stop invites the use
of racial proxies and prohibits the Court from challenging the use of race
as a proxy for criminality. By refusing to acknowledge the constant forces
of racial discrimination, the Court actually reinforces existing informal
racism. The Court reinforces the existing White majority perception that
racism is anomalous in Fourth Amendment law.8
A reasonable Black person standard would make race central to the
law regarding Terry stops. A race-specific standard would force the Court
to account for the unique experience of Blacks in police stops. Unfortu-
nately, the Court's decisions since Terry make this unlikely, despite the
836
Terry court's understanding of race as central to police-citizen contact.
b. Ramifications of the Court's Colorblind Approach to Reasonable Suspicion
The Supreme Court's willingness to justify a stop based on flight in
a high-crime neighborhood gives the police more power to stop and
frisk innocent people without reasonable suspicion. 87 Wardlow legitimized
Terry stops based on flight in high-cnime areas. Permitting such stops
without concern for the suspect's perspective perpetuates a cycle: Black
skepticism toward police enforcement is reaffirmed when courts sanction
police targeting of Blacks attempting to avoid police contact because of
82. See Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. at 677.
83. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14-15, 14 n.l. See generally David A. Harris, Par-
ticularized Suspicion, Categorical Judgments: Supreme Court Rhetoric Versus Lower Court Reality
Under Terry v. Ohio, 72 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 975, 1022 (arguing that subsequent decisions
have redefined Terry to permit more stops and frisks). But see Thompson, supra note 10
(analyzing how the Terry Court ignored the racial dimension of the case by portraying the
facts in race-neutral terms and scarcely mentioning race in its legal analysis).
84. See Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. at 673-77; See also Thompson, supra note 10, at 973-77
(discussing a series of Fourth Amendment cases where the Court removed the racial
dimensions of the case).
85. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
86. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 14-15, 14 n.11.
87. See Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. at 673-77.
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their skepticism and mistrust of police. 8" Unlike the current, deferential
reasonableness standard, a reasonable Black person standard would com-
bat this cycle of cynicism by instructing courts to consider the
motivation of a fleeing Black person when evaluating reasonable suspi-
cion.
Furthermore, in Wardlow, by equating the police officer's percep-
tion of the defendant with a "commonsense judgment," the Court
essentially prioritizes one "raced" perception of Wardlow's behavior, that
of a White police officer, over another, that of a Black defendant.8 9 The
Supreme Court reinforces the perceptions of the dominant subculture of
White America by refusing to recognize the perceptions of the subordi-
nated, Black America subculture. This is done under the guise of "race-
neutrality" and a "colorblind" application of the Fourth Amendment. In
practice, this "colorblind" approach allows the Court to substitute its
proxies for race for those of the government. By preferencing the domi-
nant, White subculture perception of Wardlow's behavior and referring
to it as "commonsensical" the Court demonstrates its own preference for
White subculture and illustrates its own racial bias.90
Instead of adopting the police officer's perception as reasonable and
race-neutral, the Court could have alleviated its racial bias by analyzing
the police officer's interpretation of Wardlow's behavior in light of
Wardlow's race and culture. If Wardlow fled because he acted as a rea-
sonable Black man in a high-crime neighborhood who feared an
encounter with police and/or bystander violence, the Court should have
taken this into account when evaluating the reasonableness of Officers
Nolan and Harvey's suspicions. Certainly, the reasonableness of Ward-
low's decision to flee is relevant to the reasonableness of the officers'
suspicion.
c. The False Hope of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
In its insistence on a colorblind analysis of the Fourth Amendment,
the Court recognizes discrimination claims under the Fourth Amend-
ment when race is explicitly used as a proxy for propensity to commit
88. Id.; See also generally COLE, supra note 18, at 169-78 (discussing the detrimental
effects of Black's persistent cynicism toward the criminal justice system).
89. This argument assumes that a Black suspect's sub-culture would reflect a different
commonsense perception of flight than a White judge or police officer's sub-culture.
However, Blacks may also perceive Black flight as indicative of criminality due to inter-
nalized stereotypes regarding the criminality of Blacks. Regardless, statistical studies refute
the stereotype that Blacks are prone to criminality. See COLE supra note 18, at 42 (citing
to Developments in the Law: Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1472, 1508
(1988)) (noting that only 2% of Blacks are arrested in any given year).
90. See Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. at 676 (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,
418 (1981)).
[VOL. 6:355
Striking a Sincere Balance
crime. 9' Otherwise, the Court encourages defendants to bring suits al-
leging racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause, rather
than the Fourth Amendment. However, as discussed below, this alter-
native route offers little hope for success. Black defendants' rights would
be better protected if reasonable and articulable suspicion were rooted in
a reasonable Black person standard.
The Court suggests that defendants such as Wardlow seek redress in
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than
93in the confines of a strictly colorblind Fourth Amendment. For exam-
ple, in Whren v. United States, a pretextual traffic stop where officers
stopped two Black men to search for suspected drug paraphernalia after
the driver committed a traffic offense, the Court urged the defendants to
bring claims under the Equal Protection Clause94 and buried the issue of
racism in a "few tepid lines" in the middle of the opinion.9s In doing so,
the Court made claims of racial proxies and pretexts essentially off-limits
in Fourth Amendment law.
96
By urging defendants to seek redress in the Equal Protection Clause,
the Court limits redress for discrimination stemming from Terry stops to
Fourteenth Amendment claims. Professor Lawrence identifies a similar
move by the Court in First Amendment law.97 He questions why the
First Amendment is perceived as a race-neutral "regular" amendment
that works for all people, while the Fourteenth Amendment is perceived
91. See Thompson, supra note 10, at 976 (discussing the Court's rejection of illicit
racial motivation as the sole justification for a border stop in United States v. Brignom-
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (holding Mexican descent, by itself, insufficient to justify a
stop)); see also Johnson, supra note 62, at 235 (discussing circuit court cases in which
explicit generalizations about race and propensity for criminal activity have been rejected
under the Fourth Amendment).
92. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 ("the constitutional basis for
objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection
Clause, not the Fourth Amendment").
93. See id.
94. Id.
95. David A. Harris, Whren v. United States: Pretextual Traffic Stops and 'Driving
While Black', CHAMPION, Mar. 1997, at 41, 42.
96. See id. at 43 (arguing that Whren "takes the courts out of the business of super-
vising" racially motivated police policies); see also Thompson, supra note 10, at 981-82
(describing the Whren Court's bifurcated analysis of Fourth Amendment and Equal
Protection issues as permitting the Court to ignore racial bias in reviewing Terry stops);
Saleem, supra note 27, at 484-85 (arguing the Whren Court's insistence that the Equal
Protection Clause is the more appropriate constitutional basis for racial discrimination
clai-s because subjective intentions play no role in Fourth Amendment analysis,
"disembodies" the Fourth Amendment because the Court has previously admitted that
race is a relevant factor in reasonable suspicion analyses and ignores the politics of race in
the criminal justice system).
97. See Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on
Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 474-75 (1990).
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as a less valued "special interest" amendment for minorities. 9 Professor
Lawrence attributes this perception to unconscious racism whereby mi-
norities are made to sacrifice for the sake of society at large when
"regular" interests are defined as White interests. 99
Additionally, as Professor Lawrence suggests in the context of free
expression, the Court should place the burden on the government to
justify a reading of the Fourth Amendment that requires sacrificing the
rights guaranteed to Blacks through the Fourteenth Amendment.0 0 Un-
der the current reasonable suspicion standard, the Court places the
burden of persuasion on those claiming discrimination under the Fourth
Amendment to show that the two amendments need not be mutually
exclusive and to explain why discrimination claims should survive out-
side of the Fourteenth Amendment. A reasonable Black person standard
would incorporate principles of racial equality in the Fourth Amend-
ment.
Even if we accept the Court's unconsciously racist premise that dis-
crimination claims are beyond the purview of the Fourth Amendment,
the Fourteenth Amendment offers little hope itself. Despite the Court's
urging toward the use of the Equal Protection Clause challenges to racial
discrimination in law enforcement, such challenges have provided mini-
mal affirmation of defendants' rights. First, such claims are difficult to
prove because they require a showing of intentional discrimination.101
Additionally, the Court has refused to accept arguments of police racial
discrimination based on statistical evidence in Equal Protection claims. 102
Because the Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to accept the correla-
tion between race and police practice despite extensive social science
research, Wardlow's potential equal protection claim would likely fail.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 475 (citing DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 30 (2nd ed.
1980); and Derrick Bell, The Real Status of Blacks Today: The Chronicle of Constitutional
Contradiction, in AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 26,
40 (1987)).
100. See id. at 474.
101. See Susskind, supra note 2, at 340-42 (noting that it is unlikely that a minority
defendant will be able to prove racial discrimination in a Terry stop because the Equal
Protection Clause requires intentional discrimination and police officers rarely admit
racial motivations).
102. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) (holding statistics showing
all defendants in crack cocaine cases handled by the Los Angeles public defender in the
past year were Black irrelevant to the defendant's selective prosecution claim);
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (Rejecting a statistical study evidencing racial
patterns in Georgia's application of the death penalty because the defendant failed to
show direct racial discrimination); Harris, supra note 95, at 42-43; Saleem, supra note 27,
at 487 (offering United States v. Armstrong to support his thesis that neither the Fourth
Amendment nor the Equal Protection Clause protect defendants against racially discrimi-
natory Terry stops and frisks).
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Second, even when the Court has been willing to recognize that
race matters in criminal procedure cases under the Equal Protection
Clause, it does not usually benefit defendants. For example, in Batson v.
Kentucky, 10 3 the Supreme Court prohibited the use of race in preemptory
challenges for jury selection. However, the Court prohibited such use of
race primarily out of concern for the equal protection rights of jurors,
rather than those of defendants.
1
04
Similarly, an Equal Protection claim based on a racially motivated
Terry stop may actually elevate the rights of residents in high-crime
neighborhoods over the rights of defendants.'0 s In its amicus curiae brief
on behalf of petitioner in Wardlow, the National Association of Police
Organizations, Inc. ("NAPO") argued that reducing stops and frisks in
high-crime neighborhoods would violate the equal protection of resi-
dents of such neighborhoods. 1 6 Scholars have relied upon similar
rationales in arguing for stronger law enforcement in Black communi-
ties. 107 Thus, even the Court's suggested alternative avenue of equal
protection for racially motivated Terry stops might not help defendants.
The Wardlow Court did not address NAPO's argument. However,
103. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
104. See Susan N. Herman, Why the Court Loves Batson: Representation-Reinforcement,
Colorblindness, and the Jury, 67 TuL. L. REV. 1807, 1814-1815 (1993).
105. See id.
106. See Amicus Curia Brief of the National Association of Police Organizations et al.
at 8, Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. 673 (2000) (No. 98-1036).
107. Professor Kennedy supports laws imposing a higher punishment for crack posses-
sion than cocaine possession. He notes that Blacks are more likely to be victims of crime
and have suffered a history of racially invidious under-enforcement of laws. As such,
Professor Kennedy argues discrimination against Black communities consists of the state's
failure to provide equal protection of the laws via law enforcement, not excessive polic-
ing and invidious punishment. Kennedy, supra note 24, at 1256, 1267. Additionally,
because not all Blacks are criminals, the burden of law enforcement in Black communities
falls only upon a subset of the Black community, Black criminals, while simultaneously
benefiting law abiding Blacks who deserve protection from crime. See id. at 1269. Fi-
nally, because diverse members of the Black community often disagree about what
constitutes good policy, courts should not invalidate criminal policy unless there is a clear
discriminatory purpose behind the policy. See id. at 1274.
Professor Cole challenges Kennedy's central premise that law enforcement in
Black communities benefits law abiding Blacks. Cole argues the impact of vast incarcera-
tion of Blacks affects the Black community at large and does not effectively reduce crime.
See David Cole, The Paradox of Race and Crime: A Comment on Randall Kennedy's "Politics
of Distinction," 83 GEO. L.J. 2547, 2558 (1995). Plus, while Blacks residing in inner cities
are disproportionately victimized by crime, they are also disproportionately victimized by
the police. See id. at 2561. Finally, even policies with a mere racially disparate impact
reinforce stereotypes of all Blacks as potential criminals. See id. Facially neutral criminal
policies stigmatize Blacks as much as intentionally discriminatory policies. See id. at 2551,
2569.
108. NAPO's argument can be refuted on the same grounds that Professor Cole uses
to refute Professor Kennedy's theory. See supra note 107.
SPRING 2001]
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
given the limited success of defendants with Equal Protection claims in
criminal procedure cases such as Batson,'°9 an Equal Protection claim by
Wardlow would do little to protect suspects from racially discriminatory
stops despite the Court's urging.
A civil suit for damages alleging a violation of a defendant's civil
rights will also offer little hope to Black defendants. Even if a civil suit
alleging a violation of a defendant's civil rights under a federal law was a
tenable alternative to Fourth Amendment exclusion of evidence obtained
through searches precipitated by racial discrimination, "0 this type of suit
would not be easy.' As Professor Harris points out, civil suits alleging
racial discrimination are difficult to file against the police. ' Such cases
require tremendous monetary resources and a brave, appealing plaintiff
without a criminal record. ' 13 Furthermore, defendants like Wardlow are
seeking immediate relief via the exclusion of incriminating evidence. A
civil suit is of minimal personal gain to a plaintiff serving a prison sen-
tence because a police officer stopped him because of his race. Because
principles of equality should apply to the Fourth Amendment, and be-
cause Equal Protection claims and civil suits for damages offer little hope
of success for defendants, a reasonable Black person standard would pro-
vide greater protection for Blacks under the Fourth Amendment.
II. ANALOGOUS ALTERNATIVE REASONABLE PERSON STANDARDS
The reasonable Black person standard for "location plus evasion"
cases draws on several analogous models for alternative reasonable stan-
dards proposed in other areas of the law.
A. The Reasonable Woman Standard in Sexual Harassment Law
The reasonable woman standard in sexual harassment law is similar
to the proposed reasonable Black person standard. Feminist legal theorists
propose the implementation of a reasonable woman standard by which to
evaluate sexual harassment claims because the supposedly neutral reason-
able person standard functions as a reasonable man standard.1 14 "[B]ecause
109. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
110. See Amar, supra note 20 (advocating civil damages instead of an application of the
exclusionary rule to remedy of the Fourth Amendment violations).
111. See generally COLE, supra note 18, at 161-68 (detailing the legal barriers and
practical hurdles to such suits for damages).
112. See Harris, supra note 24, at 324.
113. See id.
114. See Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace
Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1202-13 (1989); See also Deborah Zalesne, The Intersec-
tion of Socioeconomic Class and Gender in Hostile Environment Claims Under Title VII: Who is
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men still exercise control over most workplaces, their views of sexual
behavior in the workplace remain the norm" and thereby define reason-
ableness." '5 Similarly, most judges are men who have been socialized to
accept the male notion of normalcy in workplace conduct.' 6 Finally,
because men are also most often the perpetrators of sexual harassment,
they are unable to relate to the experience of women as victims of sexual
harassment. 117 For these reasons, several courts have adopted a reasonable
woman standard to account for a reasonable woman's experience and
perspective in determining what behavior qualifies as sexual harass-
118
ment.
The concept of a gender-specific standard for sexual harassment law
is analogous to the concept of a race-specific standard for Terry stops.
Because most police officers, both Black and White, are socialized to
associate Blacks with criminal propensity, a reasonable police officer
standard will do little to avoid reliance on unfounded stereotypes in Terry
stops." 9 Additionally, because police officers are the perpetuators of ille-
gal, racially motivated Terry stops, at least White police officers will be
unable to relate to the experience of Blacks in the criminal justice system.
As such, the current reasonable police officer standard only preserves the
status quo of racially motivated stops.
Recognizing the inherent bias in a gender-neutral reasonableness
standard for sexual harassment, the Ninth Circuit applied the reasonable
woman standard. 120 In doing so, the court cited the EEOC manual,
which encourages courts to consider the victim's perspective and reject
stereotyped notions of acceptable sexual behavior in the workplace.'
2
'
Similarly, the reasonable Black person standard asks courts and police
officers to consider the suspect's perspective in deciding to flee and to
reject stereotyped notions of Black criminality. The Ninth Circuit rec-
ognized the different and unique experience of women regarding sexual
behavior.2 2 The court was careful not to reinforce existing levels of dis-
crimination and sanction behavior merely because it qualifies as
the Reasonable Person?, 38 B.C.L. R-Ev. 861, 869-77 (1997) (detailing the implementation
of the reasonable woman standard in sexual harassment case law).
115. Abrams, supra note 114, at 1203.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1202-03.
118. Zalesne, supra note 114.
119. See supra notes 50-62, 71-77 and accompanying text.
120. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 874 (9th Cir. 1991); See also Yates v. Avco,
819 F.2d 630, 637 (6th Cir. 1987) (acknowledging that men and women are offended by
different behavior and therefore applying the reasonable woman standard for sexual
harassment case involving a male supervisor and female plaintifi).
121. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878.
122. Id. at 879.
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commonplace. 123 The reasonable Black person standard also warns against
reinforcing existing unconscious racism on the part of police officers by
rubber stamping their raced perceptions of reasonable behavior. The
Ninth Circuit explicitly admitted that a sex-blind standard is male biased
because it ignores the unique experiences of women. 124 Similarly, the
reasonable police officer standard preferences majority, White percep-
tions of reasonableness while ignoring the unique experiences of
Blacks.
121
B. The Battered Woman Standard for Self-Defense Claims
Feminist legal scholars have also proposed a battered women stan-
dard for self-defense claims in an effort to expand legal theories of self-
defense to include an appreciation for the unique experience of battered
women. 126 Because female traits are perceived as irrational and illogical,
battered women's responses to abusive partners do not fit within a male-
oriented reasonable man standard of self-defense.1 27 A battered woman's
self-defense claim is unlikely to succeed under a reasonable man standard
rooted in male norms.128 The sex bias inherent in the reasonable man
standard for self-defense claims excludes evidence of a woman's individ-
ual experience and perspective and thereby inhibits her ability to present
an adequate theory of self-defense.1
29
Professor Elizabeth Schneider advocates for a more individualized
standard that would account for the individual woman's circumstances
and perceptions by recognizing the real difference between male and
female notions of self-defense.1 30 A more individualized approach to self-
123. Id. at 881.
124. Id. at 879.
125. Critics of the reasonable Black person standard will distinguish sexual harassment
claims from Fourth Amendment claims by highlighting that Title VII was enacted to
prevent the perpetuation of stereotypes in the workplace. Conversely, the Fourteenth
Amendment, not the Fourth Amendment, was designed to protect the rights of Black
Americans. However, as discussed above, there is no good reason why the protection of
Black Americans' right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures need be exclu-
sively relegated to the Fourteenth Amendment. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
126. See Elizabeth Schneider, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 623 (1980). Feminist legal
theorists have proposed revisions of reasonableness standards in other areas of criminal
law, as well. See, e.g., Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1091-94 (1986) (arguing
for revised standards for evaluating force and resistance in rape to account for the
women's perspective).
127. Schneider, supra note 126, at 636 (citing Collins, Language, History and the Legal
Process: A Profile of the Reasonable Man, 8 RUTGERS-CAM. LJ. 311, 323 (1977)).
128. Id. at 636.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 639-40.
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defense theories for battered women would allow women to present
evidence about their particular circumstances and perspectives. This
would alleviate the lack of appreciation for the circumstances of a bat-
tered woman's acts of self-defense and achieve greater gender equality in
the courts."'
Professor Schneider's individualized standard for battered women's
claims of self-defense is analogous to the reasonable Black person stan-
dard for Terry stops. The current reasonable police officer standard makes
it impossible for a Black defendant to present evidence to the court re-
garding the defendant's individual circumstances and perspective that
influenced his decision to flee, because the defendant's perspective is
irrelevant to the determination of reasonable suspicion. 132 Similarly, the
current reasonable man standard for self-defense claims inhibits a battered
woman's ability to present evidence of her own experience surrounding
her decision to attack her batterer. 33 For both battered women and Black
suspects, a seemingly neutral standard only reinforces White male notions
of reasonable behavior, to the exclusion of the Black and female experi-
ence.
C. A Reasonable Black Person Standard for Seizures
Professor Tracey Maclin offers a similar race-specific standard for
Fourth Amendment law within the context of seizures.134 The Fourth
Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and sei-
zures.135 The Supreme Court has held that a seizure occurs "only if, in
view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable
person would have believed that he was not free to leave. 1 3 6 Professor
Maclin proposes that the Court "disregard the notion that there is an
average, hypothetical, reasonable person" by which to judge whether a
seizure has occurred. 137 Rather, "when assessing the coercive nature of an
encounter, the Court should consider the race of the person confronted
131. Id. at 644.
132. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. 673, 677 (2000).
133. See Schneider, supra note 126, at 647.
134. See Maclin, supra note 53, at 274; see also In re: J.M., 619 A.2d 497, 512 (D.C.
1992) (Mack, J., dissenting, but concurring in order of remand) (suggesting an appropri-
ate standard for determining whether an African American has been seized would
incorporate the African American perspective); Susskind, supra note 2, at 346-48 (arguing
for a reasonable African American standard for evaluating whether a police encounter
qualifies as a seizure).
135. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See supra note 5.
136. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (plurality opinion).
137. Maclin, supra note 53, at 250.
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by the police, and that that person's race might have influenced his atti-
tude toward the encounter."" 8
Professor Maclin argues that Black men have unique reactions to
police encounters based on the reality of their experience on the streets
of America. 39 The mythical reasonable person standard ignores the feel-
ings of fear and distrust toward police that cause Black men to feel unable
to leave a police encounter even though the encounter would not be
considered coercive enough to qualify as a seizure under the reasonable
person standard.1 40 Similarly, the mythical reasonable police officer stan-
dard ignores the fear and distrust Blacks feel in a police encounter that
may propel them to flee. The reasonable Black person standard for rea-
sonable suspicion is grounded in the same concerns as Professor Maclin's
proposed standard for coercive seizures.
D. Limited Consideration of the Character of the Neighborhood in Terry Stops
Professor Raymond has proposed a framework for reasonable suspi-
cion that would alleviate at least the reliance on location in a high-crime
neighborhood as a factor for determining reasonable suspicion. Professor
Raymond argues that the character of a neighborhood should be consid-
ered only where the observed behavior offered to support the reasonable
suspicion determination is not common among persons engaged in law-
abiding activity at the time and place observed., 141 Raymond's proposal
seeks to maintain the flexibility of the current reasonable person standard
while simultaneously curbing overly broad police power to stop anyone
found in a high-crime neighborhood.1
42
While Professor Raymond's proposal is not a race-specific proposal,
it is similar to the reasonable Black person standard. Both proposals refo-
cus the inquiry into reasonable suspicion on particularized observations
143
of an individual suspect within the norms of her particular community.
Suspicious behavior is relative to one's community. In addition, both
proposals rely on police familiarity with the nuances and behavioral
144
norms of the policed community. Under both proposals, the police
officers' stop of Sam Wardlow would have violated the Fourth Amend-
ment.
138. Id.
139. See id. at 254.
140. See id. at 255. But see Commonwealth v. Hart, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 81, 84 (1998)
(rejecting the reasonable Black person standard in determining whether a seizure has
occurred).
141. Raymond, supra note 68, at 101.
142. See id.
143. See id. at 131.
144. See id. at 139.
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The United State District Court for the Southern District of New
York applied a standard analogous to Professor Raymond's proposal in
United States v. Bayless.14 The court granted the defendant's motion to
suppress evidence seized during an unreasonable stop by finding no rea-
sonable suspicion upon which to base the police officer's stop of the
Black men.1 46 In reasoning that the flight did not constitute reasonable
suspicion because it would have been unusual for Black men not to run,
the court explicitly considered a report indicating that residents in the
"neighborhood tended to regard police officers as violent, corrupt, abu-
sive and violent. 147 While the court claimed it was evaluating reasonable
suspicion from the perspective and experience of a reasonable police
officer, it suggested that police experience would require these officers to
realize that flight by Black men in this neighborhood was not reasonably
-s i i u 148
While Raymond's proposal would help protect Black men in Sam
Wardlow's situation, it may not go far enough to combat racially dis-
criminatory police practice in other flight-based Terry stops because her
proposal focuses on the neighborhood and not on the race of the suspect.
Raymond's theory offers no help to a Black man who is fleeing in a low-
crime, predominately White neighborhood. This behavior may not be
common for the average community member, yet it may be completely
rational for a Black man who has been previously targeted by police in
such a community. The race-specific reasonable Black person standard
would account for the suspect's perceptions of the police, beyond mere
analysis of the suspect's behavior within a particular community. While
Raymond's proposal points correctly toward circumscribing police dis-
cretion in stopping Blacks based on minimal suspicion, the reasonable
Black person standard would strike directly at the heart of police-
minority tension by limiting raced decisions to stop Blacks even beyond
the confines of high-crime neighborhoods.
After a rehearing, the District Court retreated from its original
holding in Bayless and adhered to the reasonable police officer standard. 
4 9
The government produced evidence to convince the court that the stop
was reasonable under the deferential reasonable suspicion standard."O The
court apparently abandoned its prior concern with the norms of the
neighborhood despite the defendant's claim that the new holding was
145. 913 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
146. Id. at 236-37.
147. Id. at 242.
148. See id. at 239.
149. United States v. Bayless, 921 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (vacating 913 F.
Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)).
150. See id. at 216.
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prompted by extensive political pressure.'-" If the District Court had
justified its initial reasoning on a race-specific standard rather than tweak
its reasoning to fit into a modified traditional reasonable suspicion stan-
dard similar to Professor Raymond's, the decision would have been
more defensible. Under the reasonable Black person standard, the court
would not have been restrained by a race-neutral reasonable suspicion
standard and could have more easily justified incorporation of the defen-
dant's perspective into its evaluation of reasonable suspicion.
Furthermore, Professor Raymond's race-neutral standard sidesteps
race. High-crime neighborhoods are predominately poor and Black or
Latino. 12 By not explicitly stating the centrality of race to this problem of
high-crime neighborhood stops, Raymond's race-neutral standard only
perpetuates the use of high-crime neighborhood as a proxy for race.
III. POTENTIAL CRITICISMS OF THE REASONABLE
BLACK PERSON STANDARD
The reasonable Black person standard will undoubtedly face broad
criticism. Nonetheless, the reasonable Black person standard offers a
tenable solution to racial bias in "location plus evasion" cases.
A. The Standard As Too Subjective Criticism
The new standard will face criticism based on its individualized ap-
proach to reasonable suspicion. First, critics will argue that a reasonable
Black person standard that forces police officers to evaluate a suspect's
behavior in light of a particular suspect's race is too subjective and idio-
syncratic. However, this argument assumes that the current reasonable
police officer standard is objective. As illustrated above, the reasonable
police officer standard prioritizes White notions of reasonableness and
excludes Blacks' unique discriminatory history and experience in the
criminal justice system.153
Second, critics of an individualized approach to reasonable suspicion
will contend that the race-specific reasonable Black person standard is
counter-intuitive to the long-term goal of attaining a race-neutral soci-
154
ety. Furthermore, classifying individual suspects by race will perpetuate
racial differences and will not survive strict scrutiny under the Equal
151. See United States v. Bayless, 926 F. Supp. 405, 406 (1996).
152. See Harris, supra note 1.
153. See supra notes 62, 74-77 and accompanying text.
154. See Saleem, supra note 27, at 489-90 (criticizing Professor Macin's standard for
seizures as unrealistic because it clashes with the "current colorblind constitutional Su-
preme Court").
[VOL. 6:355
Striking a Sincere Balance
Protection Clause."'5 Professor Maclin identified this potential criticism to
her race-specific approach to determining the level of coercion in a sei-
zure.'16 She persuasively rebuts this criticism by arguing that the standard
merely considers race as one of several factors.'5 7 Furthermore, it is nar-
rowly tailored to achieve the legitimate state interest in protecting
individuals' Fourth Amendment right to not be subject to unreasonable
seizures.'5 8 Finally, to adequately combat racism and not perpetuate cur-
rent hostility between Blacks and the police, the legal system must first
account for true racial disparities in the criminal justice system.159
Third, critics may also fear that requiring police officers to explicitly
consider race will invite theories of rational racism. 16 Under such theo-
ries, race is a permissible proxy for criminal propensity when statistical
data supports the correlation between race and criminal propensity.1
6
1
Racism seems rational and police officers are justified in relying upon the
predictive power of race in stopping Blacks, because Blacks commit a
disproportionate number of street crimes. 162 If one accepts the correlation
between criminality and Blackness, then there is no need to disguise the
rational use of race with a proxy, such as high-crime neighborhoods.
However, several scholars have effectively refuted theories of ra-
tional racism while simultaneously recognizing the centrality of race in
criminal law. For example, Professor Harris criticizes rational racism as
relying on a self-fulfilling prophecy. 163 If police stop more Blacks, then
more Blacks are likely to be prosecuted and ultimately convicted. 6 4 Pro-
fessor Cole also argues that while Blacks are arrested and convicted for a
disproportionate amount of violent crimes, only about two percent of
Blacks are arrested for any crime in any given year, making it likely that a
police officer who stops suspects on the basis of race will stop many more
155. Racial classification are subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Koresmatsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944) (proclaiming all racial classifications are subject to the "most rigid scrutiny").
156. See Macin, supra note 53, at 270.
157. See id. at 270 n.107.
158. See id.
159. See id. at 270.
160. Such theories are rarely admitted by police officers because when the police rely
upon theories of rational racism in deciding whom to stop they violate the Equal Protec-
tion Clause by employing a racial classification as state actors. See Susskind, supra note 2,
at 339-42.
161. See COLE, supra note 18, at 41-42 (presenting and refuting rational reliance on
racism).
162. Id.
163. See Harris, supra note 24, at 294-98.
164. See Id.
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innocent people than guilty people. 16' Finally, Professor Armour refutes
arguments of rational racism within the context of criminal self-defense
theories. Armour concludes that by permitting the consideration of ra-
tional racism in self-defense claims the court impermissibly emphasizes or
exploits racial fears. 166 Similarly, if the Court were to permit rational
racism to justify Terry stops under the reasonable Black person standard,
the Court would impermissibly exploit racial fears.
While the new standard would require police officers to explicitly
consider race, it would not permit reliance on theories of rational racism
because the standard would take the suspect's perspective into account.
Under the current reasonable police officer standard, unconsciously racist
motivations are accepted as rational by defining the reasonable police
officer as an unconscious racist. 167 Because most police officers hold racist
assumptions or subscribe to theories of rational racism, and a Terry stop is
justified if a reasonable police officer would be suspicious of a Black
suspect, the reasonable person standard perpetuates and exploits racist
stereotypes.16 The reasonable Black person standard is an alternative
standard by which to measure reasonable suspicion and would not permit
even unconscious reliance on rational racism.
Fourth, critics will also argue that the reasonable Black person stan-
dard creates a special Fourth Amendment standard for Blacks as a form of
affirmative action. Professor Maclin anticipates this critique of her stan-
dard for seizures. 169 As Professor Maclin argues, a race-specific standard
would only provide Blacks with rights currently denied, but granted by
the Fourth Amendment.
7 0
165. COLE, supra note 18, at 42 (citing Developments in the Law: Race and the
Criminal Process, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1472, 1508 (1988)).
166. See Armour, supra note 50 (identifying three models of rational racists: the Rea-
sonable Racist, the Intelligent Bayesian, and the Involuntary Negrophobe and
distinguishing their illegitimate self-defense claims from legitimate battered women's self-
defense claims). For a more detailed discussion, see JODY DAVID ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA
AND REASONABLE RACISM, THE HIDDEN COSTS OF BEING BLACK IN AMERICA (1997).
167. Similarly, Judge Posner's opinion in Wassel v. Adams, 865 F.2d 849 (7th Cir.
1989), implies that the reasonable person standard is really a reasonable racist. Judge
Posner, although willing to adjust the actual share of negligence, affirmed a jury's decision
that held a female rape victim 97% to blame for failing to anticipate the inherent danger
in allowing a Black man into her motel room in a high-crime neighborhood. See id. at
856. The opinion suggests that a reasonable person should have known better. Judge
Posner's, and the jury's, "reasonable person" is a reasonable racist working under racist
assumptions. By preferencing the reasonable racist standard over the reasonable person
standard of a non-racist woman, Posner reinforces stereotypes of Black men as criminals
and presents such stereotypes as normal and rational reactions to Black men.
168. See supra notes 50-62, 71-77 and accompanying text.
169. Macin, supra note 53, at 272.
170. Id.
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Furthermore, if we are truly committed to treating suspects equally
regardless of their race, we could simply raise the baseline for reasonable
suspicion. Rather than evaluate all Terry stops under the reasonable po-
lice officer standard, which excludes Black perspectives, we could
evaluate all Terry stops under a stricter reasonable Black person standard.
To avoid the perception that Blacks are receiving special treatment, the
new standard would be applicable to all people. Consequently, flight in a
high-crime neighborhood would not be considered reasonably suspicious
behavior for a suspect of any race. 17' Applying this standard to all people
would achieve the same legitimizing and equalizing goals sought by
applying it strictly to Blacks.17 2 The obvious trade-off would be a de-
crease in safety because Whites who do not share the logical Black
rationale for fleeing would not be stopped. Still, this would at least en-
sure that Blacks and Whites would be afforded equal protection from
unreasonable stops and provide a honest balance between competing
interests in individual rights and law enforcement.
7 3
Fifth, additional critics who perceive the standard as too subjective
will claim that acknowledging a race-specific standard for Blacks will
invite other race, gender, ethnic or sexual-orientation specific standards
resulting in different reasonable suspicion standards for every potentially
marginalized group. Again, Professor Maclin refutes this objection in the
context of her race-specific standard for seizures when she writes, "[j]ust
because similar claims may be presented by other groups today or at
some future date is no reason not to consider the case of Black males
who have sufficient cause for complaint now.
'174
Sixth, critics will argue that a race-specific standard leads to a slip-
pery slope of specificity. One scholar objected to the reasonable woman
171. This theory of raising the baseline, developed from Professor Cole's writings on
legitimizing the criminal justice system, is similar to Professor Raymond's theory dis-
cussed and criticized above. See supra notes 149-152 and accompanying text. This theory
is presented as a lesser, though acceptable, alternative to the reasonable person standard. It
is offered as a resolution to those who would not accept the reasonable Black person
standard as an impermissible form of affirmative action privileging Blacks over non-
Blacks. Furthermore, unlike Professor Raymond's proposition that courts limit their
consideration of the character of the neighborhood, this theory does not sidestep race. See
supra note 152 and accompanying text. By explicitly raising the baseline for reasonable
suspicion to a standard based on the experience of Blacks, this theory confronts the
centrality of race head on, making this a preferable alternative to the reasonable Black
person standard than Professor Raymond's proposal. See infra note 194 and accompanying
text.
172. See COLE, supra note 18, at 187 (arguing in order to restore legitimacy in the
criminal justice system we must eradicate its double standards by "adopting measures that
extend the same rights and protections to all, even if that means reducing the rights now
enjoyed by the privileged").
173. See id.
174. Maclin, supra note 53, at 273.
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standard on similar grounds by noting that, "[I]f every distinctive char-
acteristic defining a person is taken into account, the standard will
eventually become completely individualized.' ', 7  The reasonable Black
person standard will become more individualized to take into account
socio-economic class in addition to race. As such, the reasonable low-
income Black may have a different perspective on police encounters than
a middle-class Black. Thus, the standard will become increasingly specific
and individualized to account for differences among Blacks. Critics will
argue that a completely individualized standard will become purely sub-
jective and thereby leave no clear standard for police to follow. 76
However, such critics fail to explain why this result is any worse than the
inequitable results inherent in the reasonable person standard. Any bal-
ancing between individual rights and public safety will entail trade-offs
and cost. The costs inherent in a reasonable Black person standard only
appear greater than those of the current standard because under-
privileged Blacks primarily bear the burden of the costs of the current
standard, while both privileged Whites and underprivileged Blacks alike
would bear the burden of a reasonable Black person standard.
1 77
B. The Standard As Unworkable Criticism
Another criticism of the reasonable Black person standard rejects the
standard as unworkable. Contrary to the objection that the race-specific
standard is too individualized, this criticism argues that the standard is too
broad. By creating a standard for all Blacks, the reasonable Black person
standard fails to account for diversity between Blacks.17 8 A similar criti-
cism has been made against the reasonable women standard for sexual
harassment law.17 9 While race and gender-specific standards assume a
commonality of experience based on race and gender and may not ade-
175. Zalesne, supra note 114, at 880.
176. See id.
177. See infra notes 192-195 and accompanying text.
178. Dwight L. Greene, Justice Scalia and Tonto, Judicial Pluralistic Ignorance, and the Myth
of Colorless Individualism in Bostick v. Florida, 67 TUL. L. REv. 1979, 2048 n.253 (1993)
(rejecting the reasonable Black man standard as not allowing "adequate room" for the
variety of Black men's experience with White policemen).
179. See Zalesne, supra note 114, at 878 ("[b]y assuming that there is an 'essential'
woman, the reasonable woman standard ignores the realities of differences among women
and fails to protect... claimants who do not conform to the norms of the 'reasonable
woman'); Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman Stan-
dard in Theory and Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1398 (1992) (suggesting an even more
subjective reasonable woman standard particular to the race or ethnicity of individual
women because the reasonable woman standard is too broad to encompass the perspec-
tive of all women).
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quately account for intraracial differences, the alternative race and gender
neutral standard does not even account for interracial differences.
Second, these critics object to the standard because it unfairly holds
police officers to an unrealistic standard) 80 If police officers are currently
unable to perceive when a Black suspect has rational reasons for fleeing a
crime scene because of invidious and socialized racism, how can we
create a standard that asks them to do just that? The Terry standard re-
quires an evaluation of reasonable suspicion based on the totality of the
circumstances.18' Therefore, race would only constitute one factor police
officers should consider in determining reasonable suspicion. 182 In addi-
tion, police officers would be able to effectively perceive conduct from
the perspective of the suspect if they stayed abreast of community per-
ceptions of police behavior and community norms." 3 In fact, the
reasonable Black person standard would encourage programs in commu-
nity policing, potentially restoring Black communities and reducing
crime. 184
Third, critics also argue that the reasonable Black person standard
deviates from the Terry court's original concerns for police safety. The
Terry stop was formulated as an exception to the warrant requirement for
searches and seizures partly out of concern for police safety.' s If police
officers are permitted to stop citizens based on reasonable suspicion to
protect themselves, they should not have to look beyond their own
reasonable concerns for safety. However, Terry was not designed to give
officers free reign to stop people based on "inarticulate hunches., 18 6 Re-
quiring police officers to evaluate reasonable suspicion from the
perspective of a reasonable Black person only requires them to sincerely
adhere to the Terry standard by refusing to permit officers to rely upon
racist hunches.
Fourth, critics will claim that the reasonable Black person standard
will not successfully recalibrate the balancing of individual and state in-
terests. Professor Harris dismisses the possibility of reforming Terry by
recalibrating the balance it strikes between individual interests and state
interests in law enforcement as having little actual effect and leaving in
180. See Saleem, supra note 27, at 489-90 (criticizing Professor Maclin's standard for
seizures as unworkable because it asks police officers to determine race, socio-economic
and political background, which is even difficult for detainees themselves in an increas-
ingly multi-cultural society).
181. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22.
182. See Maclin, supra note 53, at 273-74 (arguing the same in deciding whether a
police confrontation constitutes a seizure).
183. See id. at 274.
184. See COLE, supra note 18, at 192-94.
185. Terry, 392 U.S. at 24 ("[w]e cannot blind ourselves to the need for law enforce-
ment to protect themselves").
186. Id. at 22.
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place a balancing process that inevitably and inherently favors state's
interests. 
1 87
However, a reasonable Black person standard would successfully re-
calibrate the Terry standard. Unlike other proposals that attempt to
recalibrate the Terry balancing act, but fail because they are complex and
yield minimal results, the reasonable Black person standard is not compli-
cated and would fundamentally shift the focus to a race-specific
interpretation of reasonable suspicion. 18 8 While this standard would leave
the balancing process in place, it would force the Court to perform a
more even-handed balancing act. Unlike Professor Harris, I do not pre-
sume that the balancing process inherently preferences the state's interest
in law enforcement.18 9 Rather, the process is simply applied that way.9
C. A Matter of Balancing Costs and Benefits
The above criticisms assume a certain balance between costs and
benefits. When critics contend that the reasonable Black person standard
is too subjective or unworkable, they are merely identifying a cost and
determining that these costs outweigh the benefits of a race-specific
standard. 91 This assumption is unconsciously racist in itself by forcing
Blacks to sacrifice for the sake of the rest of society.1 92 Our criminal jus-
tice system must strike a balance between competing interests in
individual liberties and crime prevention. White middle class America
perceives the current balance as inevitable and legitimate because the
costs of crime prevention are primarily borne by Blacks and the lower
class. 193 Privileged Whites have the "cake" of crime prevention and "eat
it too" by not suffering the corresponding burdens on individual liberty
when rational Black behavior, but not rational White behavior, qualifies
as arousing reasonable suspicion. ' The reasonable police officer standard
appears workable and the reasonable Black person standard does not
because in the former, the individual rights infringed upon in the name
187. See Harris, supra note 1, at 684-85.
188. See id. at 684-85 n.187 (criticizing Scott E. Sunby, A Return to Fourth Amendment
Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. Rav. 383 (1988)).
189. See id. at 682-83, 685 n.188.
190. See COLE, supra note 18, at 151 (arguing if the criminal justice system burdened
Whites the way it currently burdens Blacks, the nation would not accept the trade-off
between crime prevention and individual rights as "inevitable").
191. See COLE, supra note 18, at 153, 182 (noting that "no remedy is without costs,"
but that privileged Whites avoid the costs of the current criminal justice system because
these costs are disproportionately born by Blacks).
192. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
193. See COLE, supra note 18, at 153.
194. See id.
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of crime prevention are those of privileged Whites, while in the latter,
the individual rights infringed upon are those of poor Blacks.
If a race-specific standard is truly unworkable, there is a viable alter-
native. If we care more about individual rights and are willing to
legitimately strike the balance in favor of such rights, we could conceive
of flight as insufficient proof of reasonable suspicion for everyone; rather
than insisting upon a reasonable Black person standard for Black suspects
to ensure that Blacks are not subjected to more intrusive searches and
seizures than Whites, we could apply a standard from the perspective of
those most intruded upon, Black people, to everyone. This would re-
quire privileged Whites to sacrifice some safety and crime prevention,
but it would at least strike a sincere balance.1 95
Alternatively, if we care more about crime prevention and are will-
ing to legitimately strike the balance in favor of crime prevention, we
could subject Whites to the same degree of intrusion on individual rights
as Blacks. This would force society at large to sacrifice individual rights
for the sake of crime prevention, rather than disproportionately burden-
ing the individual rights of Blacks.1
96
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's opinion in Wardlow illustrates the inherent ra-
cial bias embedded in the current reasonable suspicion standard for Terry
stops. The Court could eliminate such bias by adopting a reasonable
Black person standard to account for the suspect's perspective in evalu-
ating reasonable suspicion. This standard would equalize Blacks and
Whites in "location plus evasion" stops. By preventing Blacks from dis-
proportionately bearing the burden of "location plus evasion" stops, a
reasonable Black person standard would help to strike a sincere balance
between competing interests in crime prevention and individual rights.
195. See supra notes 172-173 and accompanying text.
196. See COLE, supra note 18, at 153, 187-208 (suggesting if police intrusion upon
individual rights were as prevalent in privileged White communities as in Black commu-
nities, the White majority would be more willing to explore alternative means of crime
prevention that do not directly conflict with individual rights).
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